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to allow the use of some device to protect
the witness from viewing the defendant. In
such a case, the interest would outweigh
the defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation.
The interest to protect child witnesses
from literal face-to-face confrontation
would be a proper compelling interest to
allow something other than direct face-toface confrontation. Id. Justice O'Connor
continued noting that the confrontation
clause "reflects a preference for face-to-face
confrontation at trial .... " Id. Furthermore, the Coy decision should not be read
to discourage state legislatures from protecting child witnesses. Even if certain legislation is judged to run contrary to the
confrontation clause, it might fall within
an exception and thus the protection
device may be used.
In a bitter dissent, Justice Blackrnun,
joined by the Chief Justice, felt that neither Coy's right to confrontation nor his
due process right was violated.The dissent
believed that the right to confrontation
gives the defendant a "right to be shown
that the accuser is real and the right to
probe [the] accuser and [his] accusation in
front of the trier of fact." Id. (Blackrnun,
J., dissenting). Justice Blackrnun believed
that these criteria were met in Coy's case.
He noted that Coy could see the girls
through the screen, the girls could see the
judge, jury and counsel, and they could see
the girls, the jury could see Coy while the
girls testified, and the girls were told that
Coy could see and hear them while they
testified. Id. at 2806. The dissent argued
that Coy's objection that the girls could
not see him while they testified was too
narrow. Justice Blackrnun felt that the
plurality's holding that the witness must
have the ability to see the defendant will
put a roadblock in front of state legislatures trying to protect child witnesses.
Justice Blackrnun also felt that the confrontation clause has as its essential purpose the right of cross-examination. Id. at
2808. This was based on Dean Wigmore's
statement that "[t]here never was at common law any recognized right to an
indispensable thing called confrontation as
distinguished from cross·examination." 5 J.
Wigmore, Evidence § 1397, 158 O. Chadbourn rev. 1974}. This principle is supported by the fact that many hearsay
statements may be admitted at trial even
though the defendant does not get to confront the person who made the hearsay
statement. Coy, __ U.S. at - > 108 S.
Ct. at 2809. As a further explanation of
this point, Justice Blackrnun gave an example of a blind person who could not see the
defendant. With a blind person, however,
the defendant could not make the same

objection that Coy did. Therefore, Justice
Blackrnun felt that the right to crossexamine a witness was the essential part of
the confrontation clause.
Justice Blackrnun believed that the protection of children was an extremely
important public interest to protect. Recognizing this, he felt that the use of the
screen outweighed Coy's right to face-toface confrontation with the girls.
Finally, Justice Blackrnun concluded
that the screen did not unduly prejudice
Coy such that his due process was violated. He noted that a screen does not imply guilt as do other things like shackles.
Id. at 2810. Furthermore, the jury was
given an instruction which told them
explicitly not to draw any inferences of
guilt from the screen. Justice Blackrnun
felt this was sufficient to overcome Coy's
due process argument. Id.
The plurality in Coy concluded that a
defendant in a criminal trial has the right
to literal face-to-face confrontation of the
witnesses against him except in certain situations. These situations arise when there
is a strong public policy interest which
outweighs the right to confrontation. The
Coy Court concluded that when a legislature enacts a statute based on general findings, it will not be enough to show a public
interest that outweighs the right to confrontation. It should be noted, however,
that Justice Kennedy did not participate in
this decision in any way.

- Richard ],f. Goldberg

Austin v. Thrifty Diversified:
EMPLOYER'S liABILITY
EXPANDED WHILE EMPLOYEE
ON EMPLOYER'S PREMISES
The Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland in Austin v. Thrifty Diversified,
76 Md. App. 150, 543 A.2d 889 (1988),
rejected a wrongful death claim, but found
that an employee who was injured after
normal working hours while using his
employer's equipment, on the employer's
premises, and with the employer's permission, was covered instead under the exclusive
remedy
of
the
Worker's
Compensation Act. The court agreed with
the trial court that the employee's death
arose out of and in the course of his
employment.
Thrifty Diversified hired John Douglas
Austin to work as a certified welder. On
the day of the accident he received permission to use the company's arc welding

machine to repair the exhaust system on a
friend's automobile. Austin was to perform the repairs on the employer's
premises after his regular shift ended.
While using the arc welding machine to
make the repairs, Austin was electrocuted.
Austin's parents instituted a wrongful
death action. The employer moved for
summary judgment on the grounds that
the exclusive remedy was under the
Worker's Compensation Act ("the Act").
The Act lists the duties that employers
owe to their employees. It provides, in
pertinent part, that:
[e]very employer subject to the provisions of this article, shall payor provide as required herein compensation
according to the schedules of this article for the disability or death of his
employee resulting from an accidental
personal injury sustained by the
employee arising out of and in the
course of his employment without
regard to fault as a cause of such
injury ....
Md. Ann. Code art. 101, §15 (1957).
Therefore, the question addressed was
whether this accident arose out of and in
the course of the decendent's employment.
In answering this question, the court
first looked at the causal connection
between the injury and the employment.
The court reasoned that but for his
employment, Austin's death would not
have ensued. Because he was an employee
of Thrifty, Austin was allowed to use the
company's arc welder for a personal project on their premises. "Moreover, the
instrumentality of the death, the place
where it happened, and the activity giving
rise to it were the same as those he [Austin]
encountered in his employment;" 76 Md.
App. at 159, 543 A.2d at 894. The court
concluded that the accident arose out of
the deceased's employment.
The difficulty facing the court, however,
was the question of "in the course of
employment." Section 15 of the Worker's
Compensation Act requires both "arising
out of' and "in the course of employment." It is not an either/or test. Both factors must be present in order to apply the
exclusive remedy of the Act.
To determine if the activity meets the
"in the course of employment" test, it
must be shown that the activity is sufficiently work-related to be an incident of
employment. An activity is an incident of
employment if "the employer expects or
receives substantial benefit" from his
employees participating in that activity.
Md. App. at 160, 543 A.2d at 894.
The court found that compensation ben-
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efits had been awarded in cases where the
injury resulted from participating in recreational or social events. The court reasoned that allowing an employee to use his
employer's equipment for personal projects on its premises also benefitted the
employer in a similar fashion as participating in recreational or social events. The
benefit to the employer in allowing and
encouraging these activities is the creation
and maintenance of good employeremployee relationships. Good employee
morale benefits the employer. "The benefit expected by, or accruing to, the
employer as a result of allowing personal
projects to be done using its equipment
and on its premises is no different than
that flowing to the employer as a result of
its sponsorship of recreational or social
events." Md. App. at 162,543 A.2d at 895.
Therefore, Austin's activity met the "in
the course of employment" requirement
of section 15 of the Act.
In holding that such an activity arises
out of and in the course of employment,
the court of special appeals has expanded
the employer's liability for the insurance
of its employees. Accordingly, employers
and their insurance companies will now
find themselves with even greater responsibility for the activities of employees while
on the employer's premises.

-Rita Kaufman
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"great difficulty" finding papers necessary
for identification. The officer arrested Garlick, charging him with failure to reduce
speed to avoid an accident, failure to stop
and render aid, and driving under the
influence of a controlled dangerous
substance.
The officer took Garlick to Anne
Arundel General Hospital where the
emergency room physician, Dr. Joel R.
Buchanan, Jr., examined Garlick. After
Garlick gave abnormal responses to a
neurological exam, the doctor ordered
blood and urine tests. The blood test
indicated that there was phencyclidine
(PCP) present in Garlick's system.
The technician who administered the
test did not appear at the trial in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, and
his report was not admitted into evidence.
Dr. Buchanan, however, appeared as a
witness, and the emergency room report,
which referred to the test results, was
admitted into evidence. Garlick's objection regarding the admissibility of this
report was overruled. Although acquitted
on the charge of failing to stop and render
aid, Garlick was found guilty of driving
while under the influence of a controlled
dangerous substance and of failing to
reduce speed to avoid an accident. The
court of special appeals later determined
that the blood test results, contained in the
emergency room report, should not have
been admitted into evidence and reversed
the conviction. Garlick '0. State, No. 12
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. filed Sept. 23, 1987).

Garlick:

CONFRONTATION RIGHT NOT

OFFENDED BY ADMIITING
LABORATORY TEST RESULTS

INTO EVIDENCE WITHOUT
TECHNICIAN'S TESTIMONY
In State '0. Garlick, 313 Md. 209, 545
A.2d 27 (1988), the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that the respondent's right
of confrontation was not offended by the
admission into evidence of laboratory test
results contained in his hospital record
without the testimony of the hospital technician and without accounting for the
technician's unavailability. In so holding,
the court reversed the 'holding of the court
of special appeals.
On June 16, 1985, the respondent Gary
Ray Garlick (Garlick) was driving eastbound on U.S. Route 50. As he approached the Chesapeake Bay Bridge toll plaza at
an excessive rate of speed, he swerved into
another lane, smashing into the rear of a
car waiting for change. The impact forced
both cars past the toll booth. A police officer soon arrived and observed that Garlick
was "extremely incoherent" and had
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The court of appeals granted certiorari to
consider the admissibility of the test
results.
The sixth amendment of the United
States Constitution, made applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment,
and article 21 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights, provide that every defendant in
a criminal prosecution has a right to confront the witness against him. This right
"(1) insures that the witness will give his
statements under oath ... ; (2) forces the
witness
to
submit
to
crossexamination, ... ;[and] (3) permits the jury
that is to decide the defendant's fate to
observe the demeanor of the witness making his statement .... " Lee '0. Illinois, 476
U.S. 530 (1986) (quoting California '0.
Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970».
Garlick argued that his right of confrontation was violated because the results of
his blood test were admitted, although the
hospital technician was not called to
appear as a witness. To support this contention, he relied upon /lloon '0. State, 300
Md. 354, 478 A.2d 695 (1984), eert. denied,
469 U.S. 1207 (1985). In that case, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland did not
allow a hospital record to be admitted
unaccompanied by the technician's testimony. The Garlick court, however, was
unpersuaded by /IIoon, recognizing that
the circumstances in the earlier case distinguished it from the case at bar.
In Moon, a blood sample was not
analyzed until three days after it had been
taken. In addition, the defendant's name
did not appear on the report, and the tests
were not performed until after the patient
received the treatment for which the tests
were sought. Considering these facts, the
/Ifoon court felt that the need for the technician to testify was .. neither frivolous nor
pointless." Id. at 370-71, 478 A.2d at 703.
Moreover, one's confrontation right usually requires that if the hearsay declarant is
unavailable for cross-examination at trial,
proof of his unavailability must be offered.
Id. at 367-68, 478 A.2d at 701-02. Nonetheless, the Moon court recognized instances
involving "no confrontation violation
because the evidence . . . offered is clothed
with substantial indicia of reliability. Such
evidence is admitted without the
declarant's testimony when producing the
witness would likely prove unavailing or
pointless. Business and hospital records fall
within this category .... " Id. at 369, 478
A.2d at 702-03.
The case sub judice turns on the business
records exception to the rule against hearsay. The court relied on a 1925 case that
examined this issue. Globe Indemnity Co.
'tI. Reinhart held that the hearsay exception
was based on the "circumstantial guaran-
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